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COMMON CARRIERS AND PICKET LINES
HAROLD I. ELBERTt and GREGORY M. REBMANtt
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor, in the continuing struggle for the advancement of its cause,
has discovered that a picket line is a valuable coercive weapon when
placed around the plant of an employer engaged in a labor dispute
with his employees. In the beginning many employers succeeded in
enjoining peaceful picketing. Today, peaceful picketing is generally
held to be lawful' and employees of neutral employers may refuse to
cross a legally established picket line.
2
By inducing individual employees of neutral employers to refuse
to cross a picket line, unions may lawfully inflict harm on an em-
ployer without violating state or federal law if the harm is merely
incidental to a lawful strike conducted at the place where the primary
employer does business. 3 The neutral employer faced with the great-
est loss as a result of its employees' refusal to cross picket lines is the
common carrier. Not only does the carrier lose business, but in recent
years actions for damages have been instituted by the employer en-
gaged in the strike because of the carrier's refusal to furnish service.
4
In two actions substantial recoveries were allowed.5
The carrier's refusal may be of either over-the-road service or of
pick-up and delivery service. In this article we shall discuss only those
instances in which the carrier's refusal of service relates to pick-up
and delivery service and does not in effect result in a refusal to per-
form over-the-road service. Nor shall we discuss the so-called "hot
t Member of the Missouri and Oklahoma Bars.
ft Member of the Missouri Bar.
1. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
2. See note 53 infra.
3. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951); NLRB v.
Local 145, Service Trade Chauffeurs, AFL, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951).
4. See, e.g., Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAB. BRE. REW. (35
L.R.R.M. 2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern
Pacific Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1953), damages assessed, 128
F. Supp. 520 (D. Ore. 1954).
5. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp. 520
(D. Ore. 1954) (actual and punitive damages awarded against 34 defendants in
amounts varying from a minimum of $250 actual and $50 punitive damages to a
maximum of $6,500 actual and $1,500 punitive damages); Minneapolis & St.
L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954). In the latter
case a lower court judgment in favor of the shipper was affirmed except as to
the award of damages, for which a new trial was ordered. The lower court had
allowed the shipper $24,211.57 damages plus $5,000 attorney's fees. Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 105 F. Supp. 794 (D. Minn. 1952). The
court of appeals reversed the trial court because damages had been allowed for
the carrier's failure to furnish ten cars which had not actually been ordered by
the shipper. The court held that damages were awardable only for the carrier's
failure to furnish the ten cars which the shipper had actually ordered. Minne-
apolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126, 137 (8th Cir.
1954).
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cargo" or "unfair goods" clauses of union contracts as a justification
for failure to furnish service. These clauses are not designed to in-
duce employees to refuse to cross a picket line, but are for the purpose
of justifying their refusal to handle merchandise of a struck employer
before or after the goods have crossed the picket line. The purpose
of this article is to discuss the rights and remedies of carriers and
shippers when service is refused because employees decline to cross
the picket line.
II. THE CARRIER'S DUTY
(A) In General
The determination of the carrier's duty has not been the subject
of uniform decision, particularly when the performance of that duty
has been interfered with by the existence of a picket line. When
common carriers accept merchandise for shipment they are under
a duty to haul it safely unless prevented by acts of God or enemies
of the King., In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Ter-
minaZ Co.7 the court said that the duty of a common carrier to accept
a shipment tendered to it was as absolute as its duty to haul safely,
so that the existence of violence on a picket line at the shipper's
place of business did not excuse the carrier from the performance of
its duty. Fortunately, the rule stated in that case is not generally
followed. Most cases hold that a carrier may be excused from han-
dling freight because of strikes of the employees of the carrier, of the
connecting carrier, or of the shipper, if the carrier exercised due dili-
gence in endeavoring to afford service." The mere existence of a
strike is not enough to invoke the rule; the carrier must also prove
that the strike made necessary its refusal to furnish service.9
6. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703). In the
opinion, Chief Justice Holt said:
The law charges this person thus entrusted to carry goods, against all events
but acts of God, and of the enemies of the King. For though the force be
never so great, as if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him,
nevertheless he is chargeable. And this is politick establishment, contrived
by the policy of the law, for the safety of all persons, the necessity of whose
affairs oblige them to trust these sort of persons, that they may be safe in
their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an opportunity of
undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combining with
thieves . . . and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner, as would not be
possible to be discovered. And this is the reason the law is founded upon in
that point.
Id. at 918, 92 Eng. Rep. at 112. The statement was dictum in the case and did not
become the law of England until the decision of Forward v. Pittard, 1 T.R. 28,
99 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1785).
7. 128 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1953). Cf. Boyce v. Anderson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
150 (1829); 9 AM. JUR., Carriers § 662 (1937).
8. Gage v. Arkansas Central R.R., 160 Ark. 402, 254 S.W. 665 (1923) ; Illinois
Central R.R. v. River & Rail Coal & Coke Co., 150 Ky. 489, 150 S.W. 641 (1912) ;
Murphy Hardware Co. v. Southern Ry., 150 N.C. 703, 64 S.E. 873 (1909). See
9 AM. JiM, Carriers § 360 (1937).
9. Illinois Central R.R. v. River & Rail Coal & Coke Co., 150 Ky. 489, 150 S.W.
641 (1912).
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To determine what the duty of a carrier is, it is necessary to con-
sider the source of the duty. The obligation of carriers to furnish
service is governed by statutes relating to their duties and their
applicable tariffs. Railroad, 10 air,1 and water 12 carriers are required
to furnish transportation on reasonable request. The act regulating
motor carriers does not contain a similar provision. It requires
"every common carrier of property by motor vehicle to provide safe
and adequate service, equipment, and facilities for the transportation
of property in interstate or foreign commerce." 3 This language,
when considered with the provision making it unlawful for motor
carriers "to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable prefer-
ence or advantage,"' 4 indicates a policy which would seem to require
motor carriers to render service to all shippers on reasonable request,
since the rendition of service at the request of one and the refusal at
the request of another could result in "undue or unreasonable prefer-
ence or advantage." The courts state that the Interstate Commerce
Act is declaratory of the common law." Under the common law a
common carrier was only required to transport merchandise provided
for in its tariff. If the tariff provided that certain shipments would
not be handled, the carrier did not violate its obligation to furnish
service by refusing to accept such shipments.16
A tariff rule promulgated by a carrier and filed with the ICC has
the force and effect of law until set aside as unreasonable. 7 By such
a rule a carrier may limit or qualify its duty to furnish service. 8 For
example, railroads, who have recently furnished pick-up and delivery
service due to competition with motor carriers, 9 could provide by
tariff rule that they are not obligated to furnish such service to a
company that is being picketed by its employees as a result of a labor
dispute. Such a provision would be a bar to any action by a company
against a carrier for failure to furnish the service unless the rule
10. 41 STAT. 475 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1952).
11. 52 STAT. 993 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 484 (1952).
12. 54 STAT. 934 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 906 (1952).
13. 49 STAT. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. 316(b) (1952).
14. 49 STAT. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1952).
15. See, e.g., Lucking v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 273 Fed. 577(E.D. Mich. 1921).
16. Chicago, R.I. & P.Ry. v. Lawton Refining Co., 253 Fed. 705 (8th Cir. 1918).
17. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Atlantic Bridge Co., 57 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.1932); Chicago Great Western R.R. v. Farmers' Shipping Ass'n, 59 F.2d 657
(10th Cir. 1932).
18. Davis v. Henderson, 266 U.S. 92 (1924); Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560(1924) (carrier's agent promised to furnish cars on certain day, when tariff
contained no provision that cars would be available on specified days; court held
shipper could not recover on the contract because it imposed a greater obligation
than the tariff, and would have given plaintiff preference over other shippers);
James v. Davis, 280 Fed. 780 (8th Cir. 1922).
19. Pick-up and Delivery in Official Territory, 218 I.C.C. 441 (1936); see
Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAE. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M. 2627)(E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
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was set aside as unreasonable by the ICC. Carriers have not placed
such comprehensive provisions in their tariffs and as a result have
been subjected to suits for refusing to furnish service. However,
many tariffs do provide that pick-up and delivery service need not be
furnished where impracticable because of any "strike, picketing or
other labor disturbance ;-120 others provide that pick-up and delivery
service will be rendered only where the platform, doorway, or other
facility is directly accessible to highway vehicles. 21
From the foregoing it is evident that the obligation of the carrier to
furnish pick-up and delivery service may vary with its tariff as well
as with the situation existing at the picketed premises. Furthermore,
it may vary depending on whether a railroad or motor carrier is
involved. A railroad often has a spur track which it owns or occupies
by way of easement from the company involved in the labor dispute.
Although the track extends beyond the picket line and into the plant,
the carrier's employees are for practical purposes on the railroad's
property and a refusal to cross the picket line by an employee in such
a situation may not be justified.2 2 The same railroad in another in-
stance may employ a cartage company or a drayman 23 to furnish
pick-up and delivery service from its freight-house to the struck
plant; the employees of such company or drayman may be privileged
under the LMRA 2- to refuse to cross the picket line. All of these
things bear on the carrier's obligation and make it necessary to dis-
cuss each case separately to see if uniform rules may be deduced
therefrom.25
20. Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M.
2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955); Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of
Public Service, 200 Wash. 659, 94 P.2d 484 (1939).
21. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Chicago, Milw., St. P. & P.R.R., 268 I.C.C.
257 (1947).
22. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 105 F. Supp. 794
(D. Minn. 1952), reversed on other grounds, 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954).
23. As the term is used here, a cartage company or drayman is one who per-
forms terminal pick-up and delivery service for a railroad carrier under contract.
24. See text at note 53 infra.
25. It should be noted that in the cases which do not involve refusal to furnish
service because of a picket line, the courts hold that the carrier is not always
required to furnish service. In The Galena & Chicago Union R.R. v. Rae, 18 Ill.
488, 490 (1857), the rule was stated as follows:
If, by reason of the condition of the country and the peculiar occasion-
an unusual quantity of grain on the line for sipment, a want of means in
the country of storing it, or other pressing cause-the company took grain
from wagons, or from boats from Oregon, while grain remained in private
warehouses for shipment, and, in so doing, acted in good faith, intending to
afford the largest public accommodation, and not from motives of partiality
or oppression, it has not thereby incurred legal liability. If the plaintiff
below has, in consequence of an extraordinary occasion, or of the public
necessities, and not from the wrong of the company, sustained a loss, he
must be content that his loss is suffered for the public good.
In Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 133 (1915), the
Court stated the rule as follows:
Ordinarily a shipper, on reasonable demand, would be entitled to all the
cars which it could promptly load with freight to be transported over the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss3/2
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Before entering upon a discussion of the direct issue, it is im-
portant to point out that the absolute duty rule announced by the
court in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co.2
is at variance with the pronouncement of other courts, including the
Supreme Court, upon the duty of the carrier. These latter cases have
recognized that situations may develop which interfere with the
carrier's performance of its duty and have excused the carrier from
performance in such a situation. The reasons for the rule are stated
in Houston & Texas Central R.R. v. Mayes. 27 In that case the Supreme
Court of the United States struck down a Texas statute as being an
undue burden on interstate commerce because it unduly limited the
instances in which a railroad could be excused from furnishing ser-
vice. The court said:
While railroad companies may be bound to furnish sufficient
cars for their usual and ordinary traffic, cases will inevitably
arise where by reason of an unexpected turn in the market, a
great public gathering, or an unforeseen rush of travel, a pres-
sure upon the road for transportation facilities may arise, which
good management and a desire to fulfill all its legal requirements
cannot provide for, and against which the statute in question
makes no allowance."'
The next logical step was to hold that strikes may also, under certain
circumstances, relieve a carrier of its obligation to transport mer-
chandise. In the light of the foregoing let us discuss the duty of the
carrier to furnish pick-up and delivery service to a shipper or receiver
whose place of business is being picketed.
(B) The Duty of Common Carriers to Cross Picket Lines
Although carriers are required to furnish service on reasonable
request, all cases with the exception of Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Northern Pacific Terminal Co. 29 hold that a request for carrier service
is not reasonable if compliance with the request requires a carrier
to subject its employees to physical injury in furnishing service when
a strike exists, or if the carrier's employees or their families are sub-
jected to retaliatory bodily harm in their personal life by the striking
carrier's line. But that is not an absolute right and the carrier is not liable
if its failure to furnish cars was the result of sudden and great demands
which it had no reason to apprehend would be made and which it could not
reasonably have been expected to meet in full. The common law of old in
requiring the carrier to receive all goods and passengers recognized that "if
his coach be full" he was not liable for failing to transport more than he
could carry ... The law exacts only what is reasonable from such carriers
-but, at the same time, requires that they should be equally reasonable in
the treatment of their patrons.
26. 128 F. Supp. 520 (D. Ore. 1953).
27. 201 U.S. 321 (1906).
28. Id. at 331.
29. 128 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1953), damages assessed, 128 F. Supp. 520(D. Ore. 1954).
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employees.30 The acts of Congress requiring the furnishing of service
cannot be used as a club for the purpose of assisting the shipper in
strike-breaking activities.
In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co.31 the
court could have found that there was not a sufficient showing of vio-
lence to justify a refusal to cross a picket line. However, the court
stated that proof of violence never justifies a carrier in refusing ser-
vice.32 The court reached this result because it believed that the only
excuses available to a carrier were acts of God or enemies of the King,
neither category including strikes.33 Before filing suit in the United
States district court, Montgomery Ward filed a proceeding before the
ICC to compel the carriers to furnish service. In Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.,34 the ICC held that the carriers
were not required to furnish service to Montgomery Ward and that
the furnishing of service to others was not unlawful, discriminatory,
or unduly prejudicial.
The difference in the two cases is that the ICC applied the due dili-
gence rule while the Oregon court applied the absolute duty rule. The
Commission felt that due diligence was shown when the carriers
proved that their employees would have struck if they had been com-
pelled to cross the picket line. The evidence in both the court action
and the ICC proceeding showed that various carriers at the beginning
of the strike had dispatched drivers with merchandise consigned to
Montgomery Ward. When the drivers saw the picket line they re-
turned the shipments to the carriers' docks. Several carriers dis-
charged drivers for refusing to cross the picket line. However, when
the carrier unions threatened to strike the drivers were re-employed.
Because one carrier had handled some of Montgomery Ward's goods,
its operation was brought to a standstill by the establishment of a
picket line around its dock and the refusal of its employees to work.
At a meeting the Carriers' League decided not to handle any more
merchandise of Montgomery Ward and thereafter the pickets were
removed from the carrier's plant. The evidence showed that closed
30. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126
(8th Cir. 1954); Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAB. REL. REP. (35
L.R.R.M. 2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955); In the Matter of Missouri Pacific R.R.,
15 CCH LAB. CAs. % 64,849 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
31. 128 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1953), damnages assessed, 128 F. Supp. 520
(D. Ore. 1954). Although this case was not decided until 1953, the facts giving
rise to the controversy occurred in 1940 and 1941, long prior to passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act. If the controversy had arisen after the passage of that act,
the court might have reached a different result on the ground that the carrier's
employees need not cross a legally established picket line. 61 STAT. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (1952).
32. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 128 F. Supp.
475, 505-06 (D. Ore. 1953).
38. Ritchie v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 42 Idaho 193, 244 Pac. 580 (1926).
34. 42 M.C.C. 2215 (1943).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss3/2
238 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
shop contracts were in effect and that the area was highly union-
ized, the few carriers who had endeavored to hire non-union labor be-
ing warned that action would be taken by the union. Other factors
brought out in the proceedings were that there was not sufficient
trained non-union labor to replace the union employees; that if the
carriers had hired non-union employees they would have violated the
Wagner Act 5 because of the closed shop contracts; and that during
the strike a union contract was adopted with the following clause:
It shall not be a violation of this agreement for an employee to
refuse to go through a picket line established by a bona fide A. F.
of L. Union .... 36
The carriers' tariff provided that they need not furnish pick-up and
delivery service there impracticable to operate trucks or drays "on
account of the condition of highways, roads, streets or alleys, or be-
cause of riots or strikes.''1 7 The complaint was dismissed by the ICC
in the following language:
[W] e think it is sufficiently clear . . . that the defendants would
have found it impossible to continue their operations with non-
union labor, and we are of the opinion that it was not incumbent
upon them to force the issue to the point of resorting to force
and violence. Because of the comprehensive unionization of avail-
able labor and the existence of the closed-shop agreement, the de-
fendants would have been confronted with strikes of their own
labor if they had persisted in their attempts to serve the com-
plainant, with the result that all of their operations would have
been disrupted and probably brought to a standstill. The defen-
dants were therefore faced with the choice, as they reasonably
believed, of not serving the complainant and maintaining service
to the general public, or of being compelled to discontinue all
operations. Obviously, as between these defendants and the gen-
eral public other than the complainant, the lack of service because
of a general strike would have been caused by a strike in which
the defendants were directly involved, and their position in de-
fending suits for damages and proceedings before us similar to
the instant proceedings, brought by other shippers, would have
been more difficult, and their potential liability immeasurably
magnified.
We find that the defendants' failure to serve the complain-
ant as herein described was proximately caused by a strike
at complainant's plant, for which the defendants were not re-
sponsible, and that because of the said strike they were physically
prevented from serving the complainant, and accordingly their
conduct was within the limitations and conditions of the appli-
35. 49 STAT. 449 (1935).
36. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 42 M.C.C. 225,
234 (1943).
37. Id. at 227.
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cable tariff with respect to impractical operation, and not unlaw-
ful. The complaints will be dismissed.
38
The foregoing discussion presents the two views: the one announced
by the court in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal
Co.39 that the duty of the carrier to perform service is absolute, unless
prevented by acts of God or public enemies; the other set out in
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co.40 and Meier
& Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons,4 ' that the carrier must perform
its duty upon reasonable request by the shipper.
The rule stated in the Montgomery Ward case is built upon the
false premise that the common law imposed an absolute duty on the
carrier. The court confused the obligation of the carrier to transport
safely goods entrusted to and accepted by it with the duty to accept
shipments in the first instance. The cases cited in the footnotes to the
opinion point up the court's confusion. In footnote thirteen the court
stated:
At common law, the practice and customary dealing of the
carrier set the limits of its obligation. A striking instance of this
was the duty to accept goods tendered for carriage, "his wagon
not being full." A modern parallel illustrative of current modes
of procedure was an operating rule of the carrier limiting live-
stock shipments to one train a week. ... This limitation was
approved by the Commission as reasonable. "It seems to me un-
deniable, that a carrier may select the particular line or descrip-
tion of business in which he engages .... ,,42
Obviously, if the duty to accept freight tendered for transportation is
absolute, the carrier could not refuse because "his wagon was full,"
but would be required to secure another wagon. Likewise, the car-
rier could not refuse to accept livestock on any day except Wednesday.
Nor could the carrier "select the particular line or description of busi-
ness in which he engages." The cases cited by the court in various
other footnotes furnish no authority for the court's ultimate con-
clusion imposing an absolute duty to accept. Nor is there to be found
in such cases any prohibition against the carrier imposing reasonable
limitations on its "holding out" to the public. The court relied on
the cases of Wabash R.R. v. Pierce,4 3 Bruskas v. Railway Express
Agency,' 4 and North Pennsylvania R.R. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank,45
which indicated that the carrier's duty to receive, carry, and deliver
goods was absolute. An analysis of the cases relied upon, however,
38. Id. at 233, 234, 237.
39. 128 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1953), damages assessed, 128 F. Supp. 520
(D. Ore. 1954).
40. 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954).
41. LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M. 2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
42. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co, 128 F. Supp.
475, 491 n.13 (D. Ore. 1953).
43. 192 U.S. 179 (1904).
44. 172 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1949).
45. 123 U.S. 727 (1887).
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reveals that they are not applicable to the picket line situation which
was before the court in the Montgomery Ward case. Wabash R.R. v.
Pierce46 involved the question of a carrier's duty to deliver when the
shipper refused to reimburse the carrier for money it had advanced, on
demand of the United States, to pay custom duties on goods consigned
to the shipper. The Court held that the carrier had a lien upon the
goods for such advance and was not under a duty to deliver until the
custom charges were paid. Bruskas v. Railway Express Agency 47 in-
volved a suit for damages against the carrier for having delivered fire-
works to a boy thirteen years of age. Nortk Pennsylvania R.R. v. Com-
mercial Nat'l Bank 8 presented the question of the carrier's liability
for failing to properly protect cargo already accepted for transporta-
tion. In these cases the courts, by way of dictum, 4' did refer to the
common law duty of the carrier to accept and deliver goods tendered
to them, but in none of the cases was the carrier's duty to accept an
issue.
The other (and generally accepted) view recognizes a limitation
upon the carrier's duty where circumstances beyond its control inter-
fere with its performance. Such circumstances may arise as a result
of the following factors: violence on a picket line endangering the life
and well-being of the carrier's employees; limitations in the carrier's
tariff defining its "holding out" by means of an impracticable oper-
ations rule which provides that the carrier will not perform pick-up
and delivery service under circumstances which render such service
impracticable due to the inaccessibility of the shipper's or receiver's
place of business; strikes, riots, and other causes affecting the car-
rier's ability to continue operations for other members of the public.
The cases supporting this view recognize, at least to a limited extent,
that due to social and economic changes a rule requiring a carrier
to compel its employees to violate or cross a picket line may well bring
down upon the carrier the full reprisal and power of the union repre-
senting the employees and result in the closing down of business.
Typical of this view are two recent cases. In Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.
v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. 0 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit would have excused the carrier if it had established the exis-
tence of violence and threats thereof to its employees. In Meier &
Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons51 the court held that the existence
of violence, the limitation on the carrier's "holding out" by tariff pro-
vision, and the possibility of the carrier's involvement in a strike of
46. 192 U.S. 179 (1904).
47. 172 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1949).
48. 123 U.S. 727 (1887).
49. Wabash R.R. v. Pierce, 192 U.S. 179, 187 (1904); North Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 123 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1887); Bruskas v. Railway
Express Agency, 172 F.2d 915, 918 (10th Cir. 1949).
50. 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954).
51. LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M. 2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
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its own employees was sufficient to excuse the carrier's non-perform-
ance of its duty to render pick-up and delivery service. This view ap-
pears to define accurately the duties of common carriers and reflects a
reasonable rule in the light of the present social and economic situa-
tion. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing dogmatic in
the prevailing view. The carrier is in the position of acting at its
peril in determining what is a "reasonable" or an "unreasonable"
request for service.5 2 Thus, each case must be viewed in the light of
its own individual facts and circumstances.
In order to understand the cases, it is necessary to examine the diffi-
culties which confront a carrier when its employees refuse to cross a
picket line. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 went one
step further than the Wagner Act and established by statutory enact-
ment the right of a union employee, assisting his fellow union mem-
bers in enforcing their legal rights against their employer, to refuse to
cross certain picket lines. It provided:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services . . . Pro-
vided, That nothing contained in this subsection . . . shall be
construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon
the premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if
the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified
or approved by a representative of such employees whom such
employer is required to recognize under this Act. . .. 53
If there was any question about the right of an employee to refuse
to cross a legally established picket line, the above provision of the
LMRA settled such question and the Supreme Court of the United
States recognized this right in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co.54
Although the Court in that case upheld the right of an employer to dis-
charge an employee for refusing to cross a picket line when the union
contract so required, the Court nevertheless indicated that in a proper
case an employee could refuse to cross a picket line when protected by
an appropriate bargaining contract provision.5 5 The LMRA does not
permit the employees of the carrier to refuse to cross all picket lines,
and of course the employees, notwithstanding the contractual pro-
vision, will not be justified in their refusal if the picketing is not legal.
If the employees of a motor common carrier exercise the right given
them under the LMRA, the carrier is faced with the problem of per-
52. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126
(8th Cir. 1954).
53. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (4) (1952).
54. 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
55. Id. at 80.
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forming its duty to furnish service under the Interstate Commerce
Act while the shipper's place of business is being legally picketed.
In Local 89, General Drivers, AFL v. American Tobacco Co."0 and
Beck & Gregg Hardware Co. v. Cook,5 7 injunctive relief was sought to
compel union employees of carriers to cross picket lines and furnish
service to the picketed employer. The highest courts of Kentucky
and Georgia, respectively, affirmed the granting of injunctive relief
and held the picket line clauses in the bargaining contracts invalid
because they conflicted with the duties of the common carrier's em-
ployees. General Drivers was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court in a per curiam opinion,8 apparently on the ground that "unfair
labor practices" might be involved and that by applying the doctrine
of pre-emption the remedy, if any, was before the NLRB. Thus, it
would seem that the question of the applicability of the picket line
provisions of the LMRA to common carriers, other than railroads,
was put at rest.
It is noteworthy that while the LMRA was enacted in 1947, Part
II of the Interstate Commerce Act,5 9 being a re-enactment of the
Motor Carriers Act of 1935, was passed in 1940, seven years prior to
LMRA. Since the LMRA made no exception or exclusion from its
terms, obligations, or rights in the case of motor carriers or their em-
ployees, it must be presumed that Congress intended the rights, duties,
and benefits of the LMRA to extend to the employees of motor com-
mon carriers.60
56. 258 S.W:2d 903 (Ky. 1953). In recent years the NLRB has been confronted
with the validity of hot cargo clauses in union contracts. In these cases it was
contended that the clauses were illegal and that the action of the neutral em-
ployer's employees in refusing to handle cargo on the basis of the union contract
was an unfair labor practice. Originally, such clauses were upheld. Rabouin v.
NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952); Madden v. Local 442, Teamsters Union, AFL,
114 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Wis. 1953); Local 135, Teamsters Union, AFL, 105
N.L.R.A. 740 (1953). In Madden v. Local 442, Teamsters Union, AFL, supra,
the shipper brought out-bound freight to the terminal and the carrier employees
refused to handle it. However, the shipper did pick up in-bound freight at the
carrier's dock. The court refused to issue an injunction sought by the NLRB,
thereby upholding the hot cargo clause. In Local 554, Teamsters Union, AFL,
35 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1954), two NLRB members voted to hold the hot cargo clause
void and two voted to hold it valid. Chairman Farmer, the fifth member of the
board, found that the union had violated the secondary boycott ban of the NLRA.
but he did not find the hot cargo clause invalid. The violation was the act of
the union in inducing the employees of the secondary employers not to handle
"unfair" goods after their employers had given express instructions that the
goods were to be handled.
57. 210 Ga. 608, 82 S.E.2d 4 (1954).
58. 75 Sup. Ct. 569 (1955).
59. 54 STAT. 919 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1952).
60. But see Local 89, General Drivers, AFL v. American Tobacco Co., 258
S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1953). In Anderson v. Bigelow, 130 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 690 (1942), the court said that motor carrier employees
were subject to the Railway Labor Act when the motor carrier was owned by a
railroad and the employees were performing service incidental to rail service.
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The LMRA is not applicable to railway employees.6 1 They are
covered by the Railway Labor Act which does not contain any pro-
vision granting employees the right to refuse to cross a picket line.62
Accordingly, a railroad may be able to discipline its employees for
refusing to cross a picket line, while a motor carrier may not be in
such a position.63 In Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robin-
son Co.11 the railroad carrier contended that the LMRA provision
permitting an employee to refuse to cross a picket line was a defense
to the shipper's action for damages for failure to furnish cars. The
court pointed out that the provision probably did not apply to rail-
roads, but stated that even if it were applicable it did not relieve
the carrier of its obligation to attempt to furnish service. How-
ever, if the section were applicable to railroads, the court should
have refused recovery if the evidence showed that the carrier had
dispatched cars to the struck plant and the men had refused to cross
the picket line, and that the carrier could not employ non-union labor
to cross the picket line without becoming involved in a strike of its own
employees, and that a strike of the carrier's employees would have
resulted had the carrier provided service to the struck plant.6 5 These
factors were not shown to exist in Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. and ac-
cordingly the court may have been justified in concluding that the
carriers did not use diligence in endeavoring to serve the struck plant.
Having considered some of the facts that appear in each of the
cases, we will now more fully discuss the above cases, as well as other
cases, to show wherein they differ. In the Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.
case" the action was against a railroad for damages because of its re-
However, although the motor carrier was owned by the railroad, if it were operated
separately, then the employees would not be under the Railway Labor Act. Since
the case was decided prior to the LMRA of 1947, it was undoubtedly known to
Congress, and Congress must have intended to place those common carriers under
the Railway Labor Act rather than the LMRA.
61. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1952) provides that "employees"
does not include anyone subject to the Railway Labor Act.
62. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952). Common carriers by
air are also subject to the Railway Labor Act. 49 STAT. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C.§ 181 (1952).
63. Cf. In the Matter of Missouri Pacific R.R., 15 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 64, 849 (E.D.
Mo. 1948).
64. 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954).
65. Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M.
2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
66. 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954). In that case the tariff of the railroad pro-
vided that orders must be given for any cars desired. The trial court had allowed
damages for ten cars which were ordered and ten additional cars which were
needed but never actually ordered. In holding defendant liable the trial court
said the plaintiff was not required to do a useless act and order cars when it knew
that they would not be delivered. The court of appeals reversed the ruling of
the trial court and held that the useless act principle was not applicable to carrier
tariffs and that the carrier could only be held liable for cars actually ordered. If
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fusal to furnish ten rail cars as requested by the shipper. The railroad
had a spur track which served the shipper's loading platform; the
picket line extended across the track so that the picketing employees
were trespassing on railroad property. The shipper had previously
obtained a mandatory injunction requiring the railroad to furnish
service. The railroad employees were not members of the interna-
tional union involved in the strike and there was no showing that the
railroad would have been involved in a labor dispute with its employ-
ees had it endeavored to require them to cross the picket line. There
was also no showing that the railroad tariff contained an impracticable
operations rule. Under such circumstances the court concluded that
the railroad was required to furnish service, and because it had failed
to do so it was liable in damages. The court recognized that the car-
rier's liability must be determined by its tariff.6 7 The defendant at-
tempted to excuse its failure to furnish service because of the asserted
fear of its employees as a result of threats of violence. Although the
court of appeals was required to follow the trial court's determination
of fact that such fears were unfounded, the appellate court indicated
that if the trial court had found sufficient evidence of the employees'
fears of violence it would not have set aside a finding excusing the rail-
road of the duty. to furnish service.
In Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Service', pro-
ceedings were instituted by a shipper before the Washington Depart-
ment of Public Service to compel motor carriers to furnish pick-up and
delivery service. The shipper was engaged in a. labor dispute and a.
picket line had been placed around its plant. As a defense the carriers
attempted to prove that the impracticable operations clause of their
tariff applied. The evidence did not disclose any violence or threats
of violence but did show that the Teamsters Union had threatened to
call a strike if the carriers either required their employees to cross the
picket line or discharged them for failure to do so. During the strike
other companies did cross the picket line in question. The Supreme
Court of Washington held that the impracticable operations clause
a carrier should endeavor to embargo a shipper because of the existence of a
picket line, the court might well hold that under such circumstances the useless
act doctrine should be applied and the carrier would be held liable for shipments
not actually ordered. Furthermore, the question whether embargoes are dis-
criminatory may be raised by shippers both in court and ICC proceedings. United
States v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 254 Fed. 335 (D.N.J. 1918); Baltimore
Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 45 I.C.C. 40 (1917). By an
embargo a carrier may succeed in compelling the shipper to apply to the ICC to
have the embargo declared unreasonable before the shipper would be entitled to
maintain an action for damages. See United States v. Metropolitan Lumber Co.,
sup'a. The embargo regulations for motor carriers are contained in 49 C.F.R.§§ 220.1-223 (1949).
67. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126,
136 (8th Cir. 1954).
68. 200 Wash. 659, 94 P.2d 484 (1939).
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referred only to conditions on the picket line which made it impracti-
cable for trucks to pass and did not refer to conditions elsewhere which
might involve the carrier in a strike. This case was decided, however,
prior to the LMRA of 1947. If the court would have had before it the
provisions of the LMRA, 69 permitting employees to refuse to cross a
legally established picket line, the result might well have been differ-
ent. Furthermore, Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Public
Service is not in accord with the decisions of the ICC in Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.7° and of the United
States district court in Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons.71
In the latter two cases the impracticable operations clause was con-
strued to be applicable where the carrier might have become involved
in labor difficulties and unable to serve the general public, although it
was not physically impossible for the carrier to cross the picket line.
In Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons it was alleged that
the defendant carriers and the defendant unions, having negotiated
an industry-wide contract with a picket line clause, had conspired to
deny service to the plaintiff in violation of the Interstate Commerce
Act. The shipper also claimed that the refusal of the carriers to per-
form pick-up and delivery service rendered the carriers liable for
damages. The facts showed that defendant's plant was struck in Feb-
ruary, 1952, and that thereafter a picket line was established in front
of said plant; that plaintiff had recruited a new working force and
was in operation late in the summer of 1952; that the picket line re-
mained and that the carriers had refused to furnish pick-up and
delivery service, except in a few isolated instances. The evidence also
showed both threats of violence and actual violence during the strike.
The carriers' tariffs contained the impracticable operations provision,
and the union contracts contained the picket line clause. The court dis-
tinguished this case on the grounds, among others, that the defendant
carriers did make some effort to compel their employees to cross the
picket line, that there was proven violence, and further, that there
was proof that a carrier's discharge of an employee who had refused to
cross the line had resulted in a strike. The court concluded that in the
light of the facts "the proof failed to sustain any charge of wrong-
doing for which the defendants are liable in damages."7 2
In Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Chicago, Milw., St. P. & P.R.R.,73
carriers, whose tariff provided that pick-up and delivery service would
be rendered where the platform, doorway, or other facility was di-
rectly accessible to highway vehicles, failed to render service to com-
69. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1952).
70. 42 M.C.C. 225 (1943).
71. LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M. 2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
72. Id. at 2686.
73. 268 I.C.C. 257 (1947).
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plainant because of the existence of a picket line. The evidence did
not show any violence or threat of violence on the picket line. How-
ever, the carriers had closed shop contracts so that if they had em-
ployed non-union men to cross the picket line or if they had disciplined
employees for failure to cross the line, the result would have been a
stoppage of defendants' service to the public. The defendants did send
two trucks to the plant but the drivers did not cross the line because
the pickets warned the drivers to turn back. The ICC held that this
was a sufficient showing of diligence on the part of defendants and
that the shipper's facilities were not accessible for service.
A limitation on the above rule is set forth in Montgomery Ward
& Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.74 wherein the ICC granted re-
lief to a complainant on the basis of the carrier's refusal to furnish
service because of the existence of a picket line. It was held that a
carrier was not relieved of its obligation to furnish service under the
impracticable operations clause in its tariff if there was no strike and
if there was no labor dispute between the shipper and its employees or
between the carriers and their employees. The picket line in the case
was established because complainant had transferred its business
from one local drayage company to another and was an attempt to
coerce the shipper to again use the services of the former drayage
carrier.
III. REMEDIES
(A) Actions for Damages
If a carrier fails to furnish a shipper service upon reasonable re-
quest, the shipper has a right to sue for damages in either the state
or federal courts.75 Likewise, if a carrier refuses to require its em-
ployees to cross a picket line and furnish pick-up and delivery service,
the shipper may bring an action for damages in which recovery will
of course depend on the particular circumstances of the case.10
The carrier may, as a defense, introduce evidence to show that it was
excused from serving the shipper in question. For instance, the car-
rier may claim that a tariff rule excuses it from furnishing service and
that the shipper must first resort to his administrative remedy before
74. 42 M.C.C. 212 (1943).
75. 24 STAT. 387 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 22 (1952), which provides that "nothing
in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in
addition to such remedies ... ." Midland Valley R.R. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482
(1928); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co 237 U.S. 121 (1915);
Galveston, H. & S.R. Ry. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481 (1912); Minneapolis & St. L.
Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1954); Meier & Poll-
mann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M. 2627) (E.D. Mo.
Jan. 10, 1955).
76. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215 F.2d 126(8th Cir. 1954); Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAB. REL. REP. (35
L.R.R.M. 2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
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the ICC to determine the reasonableness of the tariff rule before action
may be maintained in the state or federal court. For example, let us
examine a typical tariff rule which reads as follows:
Nothing shall require the carrier to perform pick-up or delivery
service at any location from or to which it is impracticable to
operate a vehicle because of: (1) the condition of the roads,
streets, driveways, alleys or approaches thereto, (2) inadequate
loading or unloading facilities, (3) any riot, strike, picketing or
other labor disturbance.77
If the shipper challenging the validity of the carrier's excuse concedes
that the rule is reasonable and valid but contends that the carrier has
unjustly applied the rule to him, then there remains no question for
administrative decision alone and the courts have jurisdiction to de-
termine whether the rule was applied discriminately.8
It is generally said that there are two forms of discrimination under
the various transportation acts. One form occurs in promulgating an
unreasonable and prejudical rule, rate, or practice; the other form of
discrimination consists of unfairly or prejudicially enforcing an other-
wise fair and non-discriminatory rule, rate, or practice. In a suit
where the published rule, rate, or practice itself is attacked as unfair,
an issue is presented which calls for the exercise of the administrative
power of the ICC, and under the doctrine of pre-emption, the courts
have no jurisdiction to determine such issue until administrative rem-
edies have been exhausted. However, if a carrier's rule, rate, or prac-
tice is found, or admitted to be, fair and reasonable on its face, but has
allegedly been unfairly applied so as to discriminate unreasonably and
prejudicially against the shipper, there is no administrative question
involved. Such a case involves merely a judicial question of fact
whether the carrier has violated the law to the plaintiff's damage
and the issue may be decided by suit in a court of law.7 9
(B) Proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission
While Parts 1 and 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act 0 contain
liberal provisions for the filing of complaints by shippers with the
Commission, including the allegation of the failure of the carriers to
perform their duty, the remedies before the Commission hold little
attraction to a shipper or consignee who is unable to receive service be-
cause of the picket line at his place of business. This is because of the
fact that, except in limited cases not here applicable, the Commission
77. Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M.
2627, 2630) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
78. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121 (1915).
79. See Midland Valley R.R. v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121 (1915).
80. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (1952); 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49
U.S.C. § 316(e) (1952).
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can afford no monetary relief by awarding damages, 81 nor can the
orders of the Commission requiring the carrier to perform its duty
substitute for the speedy injunctive relief which could be issued by the
courts . 2 Furthermore, the Commission may well take the position
that, because of the LMRA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it should
not grant an order which would involve a carrier in a labor dispute
with its employees.8 3
(C) Injunctive Relief
1. The Federal Court
A shipper who is unable to obtain pick-up and delivery service be-
cause of a strike may seek an injunction compelling the carrier to
furnish service. In addition, a carrier desiring to furnish pick-up and
delivery service may endeavor to procure an injunction to compel its
employees to cross the picket line. When these proceedings are insti-
tuted in federal courts the named defendants usually will argue that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act 84 bars such injunctive relief. That act
provides that a federal court does not have jurisdiction to grant an in-
junction against the giving of "publicity to the existence of, or the
facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence."83
The effect of this provision has been to deny a shipper or another car-
rier, seeking to do business with carriers, the right to obtain an in-
junction requiring the carriers to furnish service when the company's
plant or place of business is being picketed.
Southeastern Motor Lines, Inc. '. Hoover Truck Co. 0 is the first
case in which the problem arose. The union was seeking to organize
plaintiff's employees and to force plaintiff to sign a closed shop agree-
ment. Pickets were placed around plaintiff's plant; as a result em-
81. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 316(e) (1952), which authorizes com-
plaints against motor carriers, does not contain a provision for reparation. Al-
though reparation can be secured against a railroad for failure to furnish cars,
24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §9 (1952), after entry of the award it is neces-
sary to file proceedings in the United States district court if the award is not
complied with in the time specified. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 16(2)(1952). The carrier may endeavor to show in the district court that the refusal
to furnish service was not a violation of the act, and that the only effect of the
order of the Commission is to make a prima facie case which may be rebutted by
the carrier. Baldwin v. Scott County Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478 (1939); Willa-
mette Iron & Steel Works v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 25 F.2d 521 (D. Ore. 1927).
Furthermore,.the carrier is entitled to a jury trial. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C.§ 16(2) (1952); Western New York & P.R.R. v. Penn Refining Co., 137 Fed.
343 (3d Cir. 1905), aFf'd, 208 U.S. 208 (1908).82. See notes 76-81 suprd; notes 90-91 infra. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 42 M.C.C. 225 (1943). The refusal to serve in this
case started December 12, 1940, and a decision was not reached by the ICC until
May 10 1943
83. 6 f. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 42 M.C.C.
225 (1943).
84. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
85. 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104(e) (1952).
86. 34 F. Supp. 390 (M.D. Tenn. 1940).
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ployees of other carriers refused to cross the picket line and to
handle interchange of freight with plaintiff. Most of the companies
named as defendants had closed shop contracts with the unions which
provided that their employees should not be required to cross picket
lines. There was no violence. Plaintiff brought this action to compel
the motor common carriers and their employees, some of whom were
joined as defendants, to handle freight. An injunction was denied on
the ground that the case involved a labor dispute and came within the
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia. The Court pointed out that if the
defendants were compelled to serve plaintiff their employees would be
forced to breach their contracts. 7
In Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc.8
injunctive relief was sought by plaintiff, a motor carrier, against cer-
tain other motor carriers, freight forwarders, and cartage contractors.
The evidence showed that plaintiff was involved in a strike and that a
picket line was placed around its place of business. Defendants had
,contracts with various unions which provided that their employees
should not be required to handle freight moving to and from an em-
ployer declared to be "unfair" and that such employees should not be
required to cross picket lines of a striking union. Defendants refused
plaintiff service because of the above provisions. The evidence showed
that defendants would have been involved in a strike if they had not
adhered to the contractual provisions. The court denied plaintiff a
temporary injunction on the ground that it was involved in a labor dis-
pute. The court held that the Motor Carriers Act,8 1 which places on a
common carrier of freight in interstate commerce certain duties and
responsibilities, did not enlarge the jurisdiction of the United States
courts beyond the limits of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It was also
held that a "labor dispute" as used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
not necessarily confined to employer and employee, but was broader in
scope and encompassed the disturbance of the relationship between
defendants and their employees which, if not stopped, would have
culminated in a strike.
Lee Way was followed in East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Local
568, Teamsters Union, AFL.90 The effect of Lee Way was sought to be
avoided by joining the unions and their officers as parties defendant
in addition to the carriers and by charging that the unions and
87. Id at 392.
88. 126 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1942). In the suit for damages by the shipper
against the carrier in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co.,
128 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1953), the court indicated that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was not applicable because the carriers were not engaged in a labor dispute
with their employees and held that the carriers should have procured a mandatory
injunction to require their employees to cross the picket line.
89. 49 STAT. 543-67 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1952).
90. 168 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1947).
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carriers were engaged in a conspiracy. A picket line clause was con-
tained in the contract similar to that involved in Lee Way. The plain-
tiff relied on Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers,21 where the Supreme Court held that a combina-
tion of labor unions, employers, and manufacturers to restrain mar-
keting of goods was in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The
court, without an extended discussion, said that the Allen Bradley
case differed from the facts in the East Texas case and that the doc-
trine laid down in Lee Way was applicable.
In Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons92 the plaintiff sought
a temporary injunction against the union, its officers, and certain
rail and motor carriers to compel the carriers to furnish service to
plaintiff. To substantiate its grounds for injunctive relief plaintiff
alleged that defendants had conspired and agreed to discriminate
against plaintiff by refusing to handle its shipping requests. Plain-
tiff's theory was based on the Allen Bradley case. The evidence
showed that plaintiff's plant was being picketed by members of the
same international union to which the motor carrier employees be-
longed. The court refused to grant plaintiff a temporary injunction
and distinguished Allen Bradley, which involved a combination to
eliminate and prevent all competition by controlling prices and mar-
kets, while in Meier & Pohlmann the joint action of the carriers was
based on a labor contract negotiated on behalf of the motor carriers
which contained a clause that the employees need not cross picket
lines. The contract in Meier & Pohlmann had terminated a strike and
had been negotiated long prior to the company's labor difficulties.
Furthermore, in Allen Bradley the employers stood to profit by the
combination. In Meier & Pohlmann the motor carriers could not have
profited but would have had a "dead loss" because plaintiff could have
used competing rail service.
In Overton Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL°3 a federal district court
in Michigan held that courts have no jurisdiction to grant an injunc-
tion when it is sought on the grounds of violation of a non-labor
statute-in this case a state anti-conspiracy act-where the effect
would be to interfere by judicial process with a labor dispute. The
basis of the court's holding was that the basic issue involved the exist-
ence of an unfair labor practice. The determination of this question
was committed by Congress to the NLRB, thereby pre-empting the
field.
Injunctive relief may be sought by shippers against railroads or by
railroads against a picketing union. Injunctive relief may be granted
91. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
92. Meier & Pohlmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 113 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Mo.
1953). For further disposition of the case, see LAB. REL. REP. (35 L.R.R.M.
2627) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 1955).
93. 32 L.R.R.M. 2614 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
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in a case involving a railroad where the same relief would not be
granted in a case involving a motor carrier, since the motor carrier is
covered by the LMRA while the railroad is under the Railway Labor
Act.9 ' Furthermore, in railroad cases a fundamental distinction exists
in that the right-of-way leading into the plant often belongs to the
railroad, and when pickets cross over the right-of-way they are tres-
passers on the railroad's property and the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
not applicable.9 5 In Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St.
L. Ry.6 a shipper brought suit against a railroad to compel perform-
ance of service, and in Erie R.R. v. Local 1286, International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n 97 the railroad sought to prevent the union from
maintaining a picket line across its tracks which led into a plant in-
volved in a labor dispute with the union. In both cases injunctive re-
lief was granted because there was no labor dispute between the
parties and thus Norris-LaGuardia did not apply. In the Pacific
Gamble Robinson Co. case the court pointed out that since the rail-
road employees were not members of the striking union they were not
required to recognize the picket line. In the Erie case the court said
that Erie was merely endeavoring to enjoin the union from interfer-
ing with its employees' performance of their duties.
2. The State Court
In Local 89, General Drivers, AFL v. American Tobacco Co.,8 plain-
tiff, a shipper who was engaged in a labor dispute, instituted an action
to enjoin certain picketing and to compel drivers who were members
of the same union picketing plaintiff's plant to cross the picket line and
to perform pick-up and delivery service. The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky held that the failure of the drivers to cross the picket line
was a violation of the common, statutory, and constitutional law of
Kentucky, and that injunctive relief was proper. Defendants had
contended that the LMRA was controlling because an unfair labor
practice might be involved and therefore the court would not have
jurisdiction. The court rejected this, stating that the LMRA was
94. 49 STAT. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 152(2) (1952).
95. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Local 432, International Woodworkers, CIO, 104
F. Supp. 748 (1952); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Local 568, Teamsters Union, AFL, 90
F. Supp. 640 (W.D. La. 1950).
96. 83 F. Supp. 860 (D. Minn. 1949). 25 STAT. 862 (1889), 49 U.S.C. § 23(1952), provides for the issuance of a writ of mandamus by the United States
district court on complaint by a shipper that the common carrier does not move
the shipper's interstate traffic "at the same rates as are charged, or upon terms
or conditions as favorable as those given by said common carrier for like traffic
under similar conditions to any other shipper. .. ." This section is from Part 1
of the Interstate Commerce Act and applies to railroads, but not motor carriers.
We find no cases where a strike-bound shipper endeavored to obtain service by
mandamus, nor do we believe that relief would be granted by mandamus.
97. 117 F. Supp. 157 (W.D.N.Y. 1953).
98. 258 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1953); accord, Beck & Gregg Hardware Co. v. Cook,
210 Ga. 608, 82 S.E.2d 4 (1954).
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designed for the purpose of outlawing secondary boycotts and that
such was not at issue in the case; rather, the court held that the
issue was the carrier's refusal, in violation of Kentucky law, to trans-
port merchandise. This case was the latest of several in which injunc-
tive relief has been sought by shippers against both unions and car-
riers.9 9 In prior decisions various state supreme courts permitted in-
junctions on the theory that the refusal to cross the picket line was a
conspiracy in restraint of trade. 00
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, granted cer-
tiorari in General Drivers and in a memorandum opinion' 01 reversed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky on the ground that
an unfair labor practice may have been involved and that the remedy
was before the NLRB. General Drivers was decided several days after
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Ine.102 In Anheuser-Busch, which involved a jurisdictional dis-
pute between two unions, the employer sought and obtained injunctive
relief in the state court on the theory that the actions of the union were
in restraint of trade in violation of Missouri law. On certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States it was held that the union conduct
in question may have been in violation of federal law and that resort
had to be made to the NLRB. The Anheuser-Busch case did not de-
cide the question of whether Anheuser-Busch would have been entitled
to injunctive relief if the NLRB held that an unfair labor practice was
not involved.10 3 It may therefore be possible for a shipper to obtain a
state court injunction if such relief is sought after a determination by
the NLRB that the refusal of the employees of the carrier to cross
the picket line did not constitute an unfair labor practice. However, it
would seem that if the NLRB upheld the employees' refusal to cross
the picket line, state court relief should not be granted.
(D) Remedies before the National Labor Relations Board
A struck shipper may endeavor to obtain relief by filing with the
-NLRB an unfair labor practice charge against the union whose mem-
bers refuse to cross the picket line. If the shipper is upheld in its un-
fair labor charge it may apply to the appropriate court of appeals for
enforcement of the NLRB's order. 04 Furthermore, if the general
99. Burlington Transp. Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Iowa 135, 12 N.W.2d 167 (1943);
Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
100. Ibid.
101. 75 Sup. Ct. 569 (1955).
102. 75 Sup. Ct. 480 (1955).
103. For a discussion of the implications of the Anheuser-Busch case, see 1955
WASH. U.L.Q. 183.
104. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160(b), (160(e) (1952).
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counsel of the NLRB determines that a secondary boycott may be in-
volved, the regional director of the Board may apply to the appropri-
ate United States district court for an injunction. ° 5
CONCLUSION
It has not been our purpose herein to suggest any rules of law or
conduct, nor have we attempted to suggest any remedy or remedies
which are, or should be, available to interested parties or their counsel.
Rather, we have attempted to present the legal aspects of what we be-
lieve to be a new problem, which will become increasingly important
with the passage of time.
While conclusions at this time, in view of the uncertain state of the
law may be considered foolhardy, we do submit that the rule of
reason as announced by the courts in the Minneapolis and Meier &
Pohlmann cases appears to be the more sound legal approach to the
problem in view of the realities of the times. True, this rule of reason
may, from the standpoint of the carrier, leave much to be desired by
placing it in the position of acting at its peril in each instance in which
the problem arises. However, this situation is no different from that
presented in almost every legal problem.
As to the rule of absolute duty announced by the court in the
Montgomery Ward & Co. case, it would appear to bind the carrier to a
more stringent obligation than should be required in the light of the
social and economic order, and of existing legislation. Should such
rule become the accepted law, it is believed that changes in the statu-
tory law will be necessary, either to relieve the carrier of the duty of
performance under particular circumstances, or to afford remedies to
the carrier and the shipper which are not now available to either.
105. 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1952). See Madden v. Local
442, Teamsters Union, AFL, 114 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Wis. 1953).
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